Two-sided popular matchings in bipartite graphs are a well-known generalization of stable matchings in the marriage setting, and they are especially relevant when preference lists are incomplete. In this case, the cardinality of a stable matching can be as small as half the size of a maximum matching. Popular matchings allow for assignments of larger size while still guaranteeing a certain fairness condition. In fact, stable matchings are popular matchings of minimum size, and a maximum size popular matching can be as large as twice the size of a(ny) stable matching in a given instance. The structure of popular matchings seems to be more complex -and currently less understood -than that of stable matchings.
Introduction
Matching problems lie at the intersection of different areas of mathematics, computer science, and economics, and at the core of each of those. In discrete mathematics, they have been studied at least since Petersen (see e.g. the historical survey in [13] ); in discrete optimization, Edmonds' maximum weighted matching algorithm is one the earliest and most remarkable example of non-trivial polynomial-time algorithm; in game theory, network bargaining problems models are tightly connected to maximum matchings and their linear programming formulations [12] ; in two-sided markets, Gale-Shapley's model [5] has been widely used and generalized to assign e.g. students to schools and interns to hospitals.
Gale-Shapley's model assumes that the input graph is bipartite, and that each node is endowed with a strict preference list over the set of its neighbors. The goal is to find a matching that respects a certain concept of fairness called stability. This model has been generalized in many ways. On one hand, one can change the structure of the input, assuming e.g. the presence of ties in the preference lists, or of quotas in one of the two sides of the bipartition, or that the preference pattern is given by more complex choice functions (see e.g. [14] for a collection of these extensions). On the other hand, one can change the requirements of the output, i.e. ask that the matching we produce satisfies properties other than stability. For instance, relaxing the stability condition to popularity allows to overcome one of the main drawbacks of stable matchings: the fact that two individuals (a blocking pair ) can prevent the matching from being much larger. Roughly speaking, a matching M is popular if, for every other matching M , the number of nodes that prefer M to M are at least as many as the number of nodes that prefer M to M (this model is called two-sided ; formal definitions are given in Section 2). One can show that stable matchings are popular matchings of minimum size, and the size of a popular matching can be twice as much as the size of a stable matching (recall that all stable matchings are maximal, and a maximal matching has size at least half the size of a maximum matching). Hence, popularity allows for matchings of larger size while still guaranteeing a certain fairness condition.
Surprisingly, most of what is known about popular matchings derives in a way or another from stable matchings. For instance, Kavitha [10] showed that a maximum size popular matching can be found efficiently by a combination of repeated applications of the Gale-Shapley's algorithm and promotion. Cseh and Kavitha [4] showed that a pair of nodes are matched together in at least a popular matching if and only if they are matched together either in some stable matching, or in some dominant matching, with the latter being (certain) popular matchings of maximum size, and the image of stable matchings in another graph under a linear map. This fact implies that the popular edge problem can be solved in polynomial time (see Section 3 for definitions). In [4] , it is asked whether their results can be extended to find a popular matching that contains two given edges. Other open questions in the area involve finding a popular matching of maximum (a generalization of the popular edge problem) or minimum (and its special case, the unpopular edge problem) weights, in particular when weights are nonnegative, see e.g. [4, 3, 9, 11] . Our contribution. In this paper, we settle the complexity of all those problems by showing that it is NP-Complete to decide whether there exists a popular matching that (does not) contain two given edges. More generally, we give a very granular analysis of the complexity of the popular matching with forbidden and forced elements problem, i.e. deciding whether a popular matching exists when we force it (not) to have certain edges or vertices.
From our reduction, it follows that the problem of finding a popular matching of minimum weight when weights on edges are nonnegative cannot be approximated up to any factor (one can indeed define the objective function so that it is NP-Complete to decide if the optimum is 0). If instead, still under the nonnegativity assumption on the weights, we want to find a popular matching of maximum weight, the problem becomes inapproximable to a factor better than 1/2. It follows from a decomposition theorem for popular matchings given in [4] that a 1/2 approximation can be achieved in polynomial time by taking the matching of maximum weight from the set given by dominant and stable. This shows that our result is tight. Our findings suggest that stable matchings and their closely connected counterpart dominant matchings seem to be the only tractable subclasses of popular matchings. Organization of the paper. The paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we formally define the main problems under consideration and state our results. In Section 3, we introduce suitable notation and recall results that will be used in proofs. The main technical contribution is given in Section 4, where a reduction from monotone 3-SAT to the existence of certain popular matchings is given. In Section 5, we combine basic facts showed in Section 3 and the reduction from Section 4 to investigate the complexity of popular matching with forbidden and forced elements problems. We conclude with some further NP-Hardness results in Section 6.
Problems and statement of main results
Let G = (A ∪ B, E) be a, simple connected bipartite graph. Since all graphs under consideration are simple and non-directed, we denote the edge between nodes u and v as uv. For each vertex v ∈ V , let Γ(v) denote the neighbors of v in G and let < v be a strict total order over Γ(v). If u < v w, we say that v prefers u to w. We write u ≤ v w if w = u or u < v w, and we say that v weakly prefers u to w. The pair (G, <) is called a preference system, where < is the collection of strict total orders < v for v ∈ V .
A matching of (G, <) is a subset M of the edges of G such that, for each node of G, there is at most an edge of G incident to it. If there exists e ∈ M such that v ∈ e, we say that v is matched or covered by M . We say that v is unmatched, or exposed by M , or M -exposed otherwise. We denote by V (M ) the set of nodes matched by M . A vertex v ∈ A ∪ B is said to prefer matching M to matching M if either v is matched in M and unmatched in M , or v is matched in both and v prefers its partner in matching M to its partner in matching M . For matchings M and M , let φ(M, M ) be the number of vertices that prefer M to M . If φ(M , M ) > φ(M, M ), then we say M is more popular than M . We say a matching M is popular if there is no matching that is more popular than M ; in other words, φ(M, M ) ≥ φ(M , M ) for all matchings M in (G, <).
In this paper, we mostly consider the following three problems.
Problem 1 (Popular matching with forbidden and forced elements problem -pmffe). Given: A preference system (G, <),
A popular matching of (G, <) that contains all vertices of U in , all edges of F in , no vertices of U out and no edges of F out , or conclude that such matching does not exist.
Problem 2 (Maximum weight popular matching with nonnegative weights -mwp). Given: A preference system (G, <), weights w : E(G) → R + . Find: A popular matching M of (G, <) that maximizes w(M ).
Problem 3 (Minimum weight popular matching with nonnegative weights -miwp). Given: A preference system (G, <), weights w : E(G) → R + . Find: A popular matching M of (G, <) that minimizes w(M ).
Our first result is a complete characterization of the complexity of of pmffe as a function of the cardinality of sets We then investigate consequences of Theorem 1 for some optimization problems over the set of popular matchings. It easily follows that the problems of maximizing/minimizing any linear function is inapproximable up to any factor, unless P=NP (see Section 6 for details). Theorem 1 gives hardness and tight inapproximability results for mwp and miwp.
Theorem 2. miwp and mwp are NP-Hard. Unless P=NP, miwp cannot be approximated in polynomial time up to any factor, and mwp cannot be approximated in polynomial time better than a factor 
Definitions and basic facts from the theory of popular matchings
Given (G, <), we often represent < via a preference pattern, i.e., a function L that maps ordered pairs (u, v) with uv ∈ E to the position of v in < u . If L(u, v) = 1, we say that v is the favorite partner of u. An incomplete preference pattern I for a bipartite graph G is a map I : {(u, v) : uv ∈ E(G)} → N ∪ {∞, ∅}, such that I(u, v) = I(u, x) for some u = x = v ∈ V implies I(u, v) = I(u, x) = ∅, and I(u, v) ∈ N implies I(u, v) ≤ |Γ(u)|. We say that a preference pattern L for a supergraph G of G agrees with an incomplete preference pattern I if, for all uv ∈ E(G) with I(u, v) = ∅, we have:
Fix a matching M of (G, <). An M -alternating path (resp. cycle) in G is a path (resp. cycle) whose edges are alternatively in M and in E(G) \ M . We morover associate labels to edges from E \ M as follows: an edge uv is (−, −) if both u and v prefer their respective partners in M to each other; uv = (+, +) if u and v prefer each other to their partners in M ; uv = (+, −) if u prefers v to its partner in M and v prefers its partner in M to u. To denote labels of edge uv, sometimes we write uv is a (+, +) edge, and similarly for the other cases. If we want to stress that u prefers his current partner to the other endpoint of the edge, we write that e.g. uv is a (−, +) edge. The graph G M is defined as the subgraph of G obtained by deleting edges that are labeled (−, −). Observe that M is also a matching of G M , hence definitions of M -alternating path and cycles apply in G M as well. These definitions can be used to obtain a characterization of popular matchings in terms of forbidden substructures of G M [8] . We consider path and cycles as ordered sets of nodes. For a path (resp. cycle) P and an edge e, we say that P contains e if e = uv for two nodes u, v that are consecutive in P (not necessarily in this order). (ii) an M -alternating path that contains two distinct (+, +) edges.
(iii) an M -alternating path starting from an M -exposed node that contains a (+, +) edge.
If the matching M under consideration is clear, we omit mentioning that labels are wrt M and paths, cycles etc. occur in the graph G M : we simply say e.g. that uv is a (+, +) edge and P is an M -alternating path with a (+, +) edge. In particular, unless stated otherwise, when talking about M -alternating paths or cycles, we always mean in the graph G M (hence, after (−, −) edges have been removed).
We say a matching M defeats a matching M (and M is defeated by M ) if either of these two conditions holds:
A dominant matching is defined to be a matching that is never defeated. A dominant matching is by definition also popular. The following characterization of dominant matchings appeared in [4] , where it is also shown that a dominant matching always exists. The following fact is attributed in [3] to [7] . We give a proof here for completeness.
Lemma 5. Let (G, <) be a preference system, and M (resp. S, D) be a popular matching (resp. popular matching of minimum size, popular matching of maximum size) in (G, <).
Proof. The fact that stable matchings are popular matchings of minimum size and that V (S) ⊆ V (M ) whenever S is stable and M is popular are known, see e.g. [10] . Hence, for any popular matching S of minimum size, we have V (S ) ⊇ V (S) and |S | = |S|, which implies V (S ) = V (S) ⊆ V (M ) for any popular matching M , settling the first part. Now suppose that M again is popular, D is a dominant matching, and there exists
contains an alternating path P starting at v with an edge of M . Since both matchings are popular, the number of nodes that prefer M to D in P are exactly the same number of nodes that prefer D to M in P . In particular, P has an even number of nodes and is therefore D-augmenting in G. Now label edges of P \ D with +, − as discussed at the beginning of the section. Note that the number of (+, +) edges and (−, −) edges in P coincide, otherwise either D or M is not popular. We consider three cases: if there is no (+, +) edge, hence no (−, −), the path is D-augmenting in G D , contradicting the fact that D is dominant. Now suppose there is a (+, +) edge e. Since the number of (+, +) and (−, −) edges in P coincide, one of the following two facts happen: either we can assume wlog that e is traversed in P before any (−, −) edge, or there is a subpath of P that contains two (+, +) edges and no (−, −) edge. In both circumstances, we contradict Theorem 3: condition (ii) in the second case, and condition (iii) in the first.
The reduction 4.1 From a restricted 3-SAT formula to G(ψ)
A 3-SAT instance ψ is a logic formula given by the conjunction of a collection of K clauses, each of which is the disjunction of at most 3 literals. We denote the set of variables by X = {x 1 , . . . , x n }, the set of clauses by C = {c 1 , . . . , c m }, and the set of literals by L = { 1 , . . . , p }, with p ≤ 3m. Literals of the form x i are called positive (occurrences of variable i), while those of the form ¬x i are called negative (occurrences of variable i). In this paper, we restrict our attention to monotone 3-SAT, which is the version of 3-SAT where each clause consists of only positive or only negative literals. This is also known to be NP-hard, since as observed in [2] , a reduction from 3-SAT is achieved using the following mapping: replace clause c = (
where for each clause c, x c is a new variable. The other clauses remain unchanged.
We refer therefore to clauses of a restriced 3-SAT instance as positive clauses and negative clauses accordingly. From now on, we assume without loss of generality that monotone 3-SAT instances under consideration do not consist of only positive (resp. negative) literals, or that a variable only appears as a positive (resp. negative) literal. Define the positive gadget to be the graph H constructed as in Figure 1 , left. Node a is called the apex of H. Node c is called the consistency enforcer of H. Node g is called the gateway of H. Note that Figure 1 , left, also defines an incomplete preference pattern I H , which we call canonical.
Define the negative gadget to be the graph N constructed as in Figure 1 , right. Node a is called the apex of N . Node c is called the consistency enforcer of N . Node g is called the gateway of N . Edge eh is called the evicted edge of N . Figure 1 , right, also defines an incomplete preference pattern I N , which we call canonical.
To each positive (resp. negative) literal of a restricted 3−SAT instance, we associate one positive (resp. negative) gadget H( ) (resp. N ( )). We will write G( ) = (V ( ), E( )) to denote the gadget associated to a literal , whether it is positive or negative. Nodes of G( ) will be denoted by a( ), b( ), ... . Define E(G) :=Ē ∪ E 1 ∪ E 2 , where:
is a positive occurrence of variable i and is a negative occurrence of variable i} (consistency edges).
See Figure 2 for an example of the graph G(ψ).
Lemma 6. Let G(ψ) be defined as above for a monotone 3 − SAT instance ψ. Then G(ψ) is bipartite.
Proof. We assign each vertex from V := V (G(ψ)) to exactly one of two sets A or B, and prove that if u, v ∈ A (or u, v ∈ B) then uv / ∈ E := E(G(ψ)). The proof can be followed in Figure 2 , where nodes are colored according to the set of the bipartition they belong to. Assign s, u, w, y to A and t, v, x to B. For any corresponding to a positive literal, assign a( ), d( ), c( ), g( ) to A and b( ), e( ), f ( ) to B. For any corresponding to a negative literal, assign a( ), d( ), e( ), g( ) to A and b( ), c( ), f ( ), h( ) to B. Note that this assignment is consistent with the fact that some a( ) and g( ) are identified, and that some a( ) are identified with u (they are all assigned to A). One easily checks that edges inĒ ∪ E 1 connect nodes in the same set of the bipartition. Now consider c( )c( ) ∈ E 2 . By construction, we can assume wlog that (resp.
) is a positive (resp. negative) literal. Hence c( ) ∈ A, c( ) ∈ B, as required.
Our hardness results are based on the following lemma.
Lemma 7. Consider the graph G := G(ψ), and set F := {st, wx}. There exists a preference system < with the following property: (G(ψ), <) has a popular matching that does not contain any edge in F if and only if ψ is satisfiable. Given ψ, this preference system can be found in polynomial time.
We devote the rest of Section 4 to the proof of Lemma 7. The reader interested in how Lemma 7 is applied to deduce the proofs of main results can skip directly to Section 5. Figure 2: A monotone 3-SAT instance ψ = (x 1 ∨x 2 ∨x 3 )∧(¬x 1 ∨¬x 2 ∨¬x 4 )∧(x 2 ∨x 4 ∨x 5 ) and the associated graph G(ψ) and preference system. Disk and circle labels of vertices provide a bipartition of G(ψ).
The preference system
In the remaining of Section 4, we fix a monotone 3-SAT instance ψ and the corresponding graph G(V, E) := G(ψ). We start by showing how to define the preference system via the preference pattern L.
Consider the union I of all canonical incomplete preference patterns for gadgets corresponding to literals of ψ. Recall that vertex sets of gadgets are disjoint subsets of V , with the exception of g( 1 ) ≡ a( 2 ), with 2 being the literal following 1 in some clause, and u ≡ a( ), with first literal in some clause. However, the canonical incomplete preference patterns assign ∅ to edges incident to nodes a( ). Hence, I is an incomplete preference pattern for G.
Consider the preference system L that: agrees with I; has values L(
assigns L for the remaining ordered pairs of adjacent nodes for which it has not been defined yet.
-L(u, b( )), for all literals that are first in some clause, and uc( ) for all negative literals that are first in some clause. Since L(u, t) = 1 and no other edge is incident to u, we can assign L(u, v) for v = b( ) or v ∈ {b( ), c( )} as above, through an arbitrary bijection to {2, . . . , |Γ(v)|}. -L(a( ), b( )), L(a( ), b( )) for all negative literals that are not first in some clause. Recall that we have L(a( ), f ( )) = 1 for some . We set therefore
We let (G, <) be the preference system corresponding to the preference pattern L. We now start deriving properties of matchings that are popular in (G, <) and satisfy some further hypothesis. In the proof of the next and following lemmas, we often deduce a contradiction using the characterization of popular matchings given in Theorem 3, hence we omit referring explicitly to this theorem each time.
Properties of certain popular matchings of (G, <)
Lemma 8. Let M be a popular matching of (G, <) that does not contain any evicted edge. Then M does not contain any consistency edge, i.e., M ∩ E 2 = ∅.
Proof. Suppose by contradiction that M contains a consistency edge, connecting positive gadget H( ) and negative gadget N ( ). We focus now on nodes of N ( ), hence omit the dependency on . Since the consistency edge incident to c is matched, if d is not matched, then cd would be a (+, +) edge adjacent to an unmatched vertex, which contradicts popularity. Hence, bd ∈ M , which in turn implies ef ∈ M , otherwise be is a (+, +) edge adjacent to an unmatched vertex, again a contradiction (recall that eh / ∈ M by hypothesis). This implies that he is a (+, −) edge, f g is a (+, +) edge, and h, e, f, g is an M -alternating path containing a (+, +) edge, a contradiction.
Lemma 9. Let M be a popular matching of (G, <) that contains tu. Then:
1. The gateway (resp. apex) of each gadget is matched to its favorite partner; 2. M does not contain any consistency or evicted edge; 3. In each positive gadget H( ), exactly one of the following is true (dependency on is omitted):
Similarly, in each negative gadget N ( ), exactly one of the following is true (dependency on is omitted): Proof. 1. We consider negative and positive gadgets separately. Note that it is enough to prove the statement for the gateway, since the one for the apex follows by the fact that each apex is either also a gateway, or u (that is matched to its favorite partner t by hypothesis). Pick first a negative clause and one of its literals . We omit the dependency on in nodes of N ( ). The favorite partner of g is f . Hence, suppose by contradictiong f g / ∈ M . Note that since g is also f 's favorite partner, f g is a (+, +) edge, which implies f e ∈ M , else f is an unmatched node adjacent to a (+, +) edge starting from an unmatched node, a contradiction. Edge eh is therefore labeled (−, +). The path h, e, f, g is therefore an M -alternating path to a (+, +) edge, a contradiction concluding the proof for this case.
Consider any positive clause, and take, among its literals, the first one that violates the thesis. Call this literal . Again, we omit the dependency on in nodes of H( ), and observe that f is g's favorite partner. Therefore, f d ∈ M , else f is unmatched and f g is a (+, +) edge adjacent to an unmatched node, a contradiction. If e is unmatched, then de is a (+, +) adjacent to an unmatched node, again a contradiction. Since Γ(e) = {d, c} and df ∈ M , we conclude ec ∈ M . A similar argument (with e replaced by b) implies ab ∈ M . Now, if is the first literal of the clause, a ≡ u, contradicting tu ∈ M . Else, a ≡ g( ) for the literal preceding in the clause, contradicting the choice of . 2. Suppose by contradiction M contains an evicted edge. Pick any clause with a negative literal that contains an evicted edge, and let N ( ) be the gadget associated to the first such literal. We omit the dependency on in nodes of N ( ). Part 1 implies that a is matched to its favorite partner. The hypothesis implies that eh ∈ M . Hence, if bd / ∈ M , then be is a (+, +) edge incident to the unmatched node b, a contradiction. Hence bd ∈ M . Since a, d, e are not matched to c in M , if c is not matched through a consistency edge it is unmatched, and ce is (+, +) edge, a contradiction.
Hence cc( ) ∈ M for some H( ). Arguments similar to those above imply d( )e( ) ∈ M and a( )b( ) ∈ M , contradicting part 1. This concludes the proof that M does not contain any evicted edge. The fact that M does not contain any consistency edge immediately follows from what just proved and Lemma 8.
3. Fix a gadget G( ) and omit dependency on in nodes. By part 1 and 2, a is matched to its first choice, and M does not contain any consistency or evicted edges. Hence, we can restrict our attention to the subgraph induced by b, c, d, e. Simple case checking shows that, if any of those is unmatched, then there is a (+, +) edge incident to an unmatched node, a contradiction to popularity. Hence, each of these vertices must be matched, and since they form a cycle with 4 vertices, one of the possibilities from the thesis of the lemma must hold.
Suppose we have both T (H( )) ⊆ M and T (N ( )) ⊆ M . Then the consistency edge c( )c( ) is (+, +). Hence, h( ), e( ), c( ), c(
) is an M -alternating path from an unmatched node to a (+, +) edge, a contradiction.
From popular matchings to feasible assignments
Let M be a popular matching M of (G, <) that does not contain edges in F = {st, wx}. Usual arguments imply tu, xy, vw ∈ M . Observe that wx is a (+, +) edge and s is unmatched.
We claim that each clause contains at least one literal with T ( ) ⊆ M . We show that, if this does not happen, then there exists an M -alternating path from s to x passing through wx (in the following, we say that such a path goes from s to wx). Together with the fact that wx is a (+, +) edge and s is unmatched, this contradicts the popularity of M . The construction of those paths can be followed in Figure 3 . We assume that the clause is given by exactly three positive literals. Similar arguments apply for the case with less than three positive literals. Recall that, by Lemma 7, part 1, apexes and gateways are matched to their favourite partner.
Suppose first we deal with a positive clause, and let H( 1 ), H( 2 ), H( 3 ) be the corresponding gadgets. By Lemma 9, part 3,
v are (+, −) or (−, +) edges for = 1 , 2 , 3 , and the promised M -alternating path is:
Consider now a clause that is given by three negative literals:
v are (+, −) or (−, +) edges for = 1 , 2 , 3 , and the the alternating path is
From M , we obtain an assignment of the literals for 3 − SAT as follows: if T ( ) ⊆ M for some positive (resp. negative) occurrence of variable x i , then set x i to be true (resp. false). Else, set x i to true or false arbitrarily. Observe first that the assignment is well-defined, since we cannot assign the same variable to simultaneously true and false, because of Lemma 9, part 4. Since by the first part of the proof, in each clause there is at least an such that T ( ) ⊆ M , we conclude that ψ is satisfied by the assignment we constructed. 
From feasible assignments to popular matchings
Now suppose that we have an assignment of the literals which satisfies ψ. Construct a matching M as follows. First, add edges tu, vw, xy, and edges f ( )g( ) for each literal . Recall that f ( ) is the favourite partner of g( ). Then, for each positive literal , add T ( ) to M if the corresponding variable is set to true; add F( ) to M if the corresponding variable is set to false. Last, for each negative literal , add T ( ) to M if the corresponding variable is set to false; add F( ) to M if the corresponding variable is set to true. Figure 4 gives an example of a matching M corresponding to a feasible assignment of the clause from Figure 2 . Note that M does not contain st and wx, hence it does not contain edges in F . We will show that M is popular by proving it satisfies the conditions of Theorem 3. This concludes the proof. Define an M -alternating path P to be malicious if it starts from an unmatched node and contains a (+, +) edge. Observe that, by construction, the only unmatched nodes are s, h( ) for all negative literals . The following claim caracterizes the only (+, +) edge.
Claim 1. The only edge labelled (+, +) is wx.
Proof. Consider first a consistency edge c( )c( ), which connects a positive gadget H( ) and a negative gadget N ( ). By construction, one of the following two cases happen:
Notice that st = (+, −), and all edges of E(G) \ M incident to an apex or a gateway have at least a label equal to − since, by construction, those nodes are matched to their favourite partners. Hence, we are left with edges between nodes b, d, c, e, f and possibly h of the same gadget G( ) (we omit dependency on in nodes). Suppose first is a positive literal. If is true, then b, e are matched to their favorite partners. If is false, c, d are matched to their favorite partners. Hence, no (+, +) edge is incident to those. In all cases, df is a (−, +) edge. Suppose now is a negative literal. If is true, then e, c are matched to their favorite partners, concluding the proof. Else, cd, be ∈ M , and then db, ce, eh, f e are (−, +) edges. Figure 2 : x 1 , x 4 , x 5 are set to True and x 2 , x 3 to False.
Claim 3. For any clause c, there is no malicious path from s to wx that is contained in {s, t, u, v, w, x} ∪ ∈c V ( ). Proof. Since we have an assignment of the literals which satisfies ψ, then each clause contains at least one true literal. According to Claim 2, a( )b( ) = (−, −) and e( )f ( ) = (−, −) for some literals and in positive and negative clauses correspondingly. Since any path that satisfies the hypothesis with c a positive (resp. negative) clause must pass through edges a( )b( ) (resp. e( )f ( )) for all ∈ c, the thesis follows.
Claim 4.
A malicious path starting at h( ) does not traverse f ( ). In particular, there is no malicious path from h( ) to wx that is contained in {s, t, u, v, w, x} ∪ ∈c V ( ) for any negative clause c.
Proof. h( ) is unmatched and e( )f ( ) / ∈ M regardless of the true or false assignment to literal . Hence P cannot take both h( )e( ) and e( )f ( ), since none of them is in M . Since f ( ) has degree 2, f ( ) / ∈ P . We conclude that there is no alternating path from h( ) to wx contained only in c.
Claim 5. Let be a positive literal, and let P be a malicious path. Then c( )c( ) is an edge of P for at most one and if that happens f ( ) / ∈ P .
Proof. The first statement follows from the definition of path. Now assume there is such that c( )c( ) ∈ P . We omit dependency on in nodes. By construction, cc( ) / ∈ M . Suppose by contradiction f ∈ P . Since f has degree 2, f d is an edge of P . We have two possibilities. First, if is true, then bc, de ∈ M . Then P or its inverse (i.e. the path obtained traversing nodes from P in opposite order) contains the subpath f, d, e, c, c( ), a contradiction to the fact that P is M -alternating. Second, if is false, then bd, ce ∈ M . Then P or its inverse contains the subpath f, d, b, c, c( ), again a contradiction to the fact that it is M -alternating.
Claim 6. Let be a negative literal, and let P be a malicious path. Then c( ), c( ) is an edge of P for at most one and if that happens and a( ) = u, then a( ) / ∈ P .
Proof. Assume there is such that c( )c( ) ∈ P . Again, we omit explicit dependency on in nodes, and the first part of the statement is immediate. If a = u, then Γ(a) = {f ( ), b, c} for some . We have two possibilities. First, if is true, then ce, bd ∈ M . This implies that P or its inverse contains the subpath c( ), c, e. Hence if a ∈ P , then ac is not an edge of P . Since af ( ) ∈ M for some by construction and P is M -alternating, both ab and bd ∈ M are edges of P . But then we must have that cd is an edge of P , a contradiction to P being a path. Second, if is false, then cd, be ∈ M . Hence, either P or its inverse contains the subpath c( )c, d, b, e. Thus, ac, ab are not edges of P , which implies that a / ∈ P .
In order to conclude that condition (iii) of Theorem 3 is satisfied, suppose, by contradiction, there exists a malicious path P starting from s. Then P = s, t, u, . . . . Claim 3 implies that there is at least one consistency edge that belongs to P . Take the first consistency edge c( )c( ) that P traverses, and suppose that c( ) is traversed by P before c( ). This means that a( ) and z are two consecutive nodes of P , traversed in this order and before c( ), for some z ∈ V ( ) (possibly z = c( )). Suppose first is a positive literal. Hence, a( ), b( ) ∈ P . By Claim 2, is false, hence is true. Using again Claim 2, we deduce f ( ) / ∈ P . Hence P , in order to reach wx, must traverse a( ) after c( ). If a( ) = u, then P cannot traverse u again. Hence a( ) = u and, by Claim 6, a( ) / ∈ P . In both cases, P cannot reach wx, a contradiction. If conversely is a negative literal, by Claim 6 a = u( ). If is set to true, then by construction cd, be ∈ M . Hence, P contains the subpath u, b, c, d, e or the subpath u, c, e (we omitted dependency on ). In both cases, c( )c( ) cannot be an edge of P , a contradiction. If conversely is set to false, then P contains the subpath u, b, e or u, c, d (again, we omitted the dependency on ). In the latter case, cc( ) cannot be an edge of P . In the former, the inverse of P must contain the subpath c( ), c, d, b, a contradiction (b would have degree 3 in P ).
Suppose now there exists a malicious path P starting from h( ). Since tu ∈ M , u / ∈ P . From Claim 4, P must traverse (in this order) a consistency edge c( )c( ) with being a false literal. Pick the first such edge. By Claim 5, f ( ) / ∈ P . Hence, after traversing c( ), P visits only gadgets corresponding to literals preceding in the clause, until it traverses (in this order) another consistency edge c( )c( ), since as we argued above, u / ∈ P . This contradicts Claim 5, since it must also be that f ( ) ∈ P . Since s and the h( ) with being any negative literal are the only unmatched vertices, we conclude that the condition (iii) is also satisfied, and M is popular.
Proof of Theorem 1
Proof. Suppose first U in = F in = F out = ∅. Then the problem boils down to deciding if there exists a popular matching that does not contain a given set of nodes. By Lemma 5, it is enough to check if this is true for a(ny) stable matchings in (G, <). It is well-known that this can be done in polynomial time, see e.g. [6] .
Suppose now U out = F in = F out = ∅. Then, again by Lemma 5, the problem corresponds to deciding if there exists a dominant matching of (G, <) that contains a given set of nodes. It is shown in [4] how to efficiently construct an instance (G , < ) and a surjective map σ from stable matchings of (G , < ) to dominant matchings of (G, <), with the additional property that a node v ∈ V (G) is in a dominant matching σ(S) of (G, <) if and only if one of certain nodes v , v are in the stable matching S of (G , < ) (see [4] for details). Since, as mentioned above, whether a node belong to a(ny) stable matching can be checked efficiently, our problem can be solved in polynomial time.
Suppose now U out = U in = F out = ∅, and F in = {e}. This is the popular edge problem, that is shown in [4] to be solvable in polynomial time. We call the case when U out = U in = F in = ∅, and F out = {e} the impopular edge problem. We show that a solution to the latter follows from the solution to the popular edge problem [4] . Define E s andĒ s as:
are defined similarly, by replacing "stable" with "dominant" (resp. popular). It is proved in [4] that
Consider any e ∈Ē s ∪Ē d . Since there is a stable or dominant matching that does not contain e, it follows that e ∈Ē p . We conclude thatĒ p ⊇Ē s ∪Ē d . Consider any e = ij ∈Ē p . There is a popular matching P s.t. e / ∈ P , and i or j is matched (if i and j are unmatched then (i, j) = (+, +), and M is not popular). Wlog assume jk ∈ M . It follows from E p = E s ∪ E d that there exists a stable or dominant matching M s.t. jk ∈ M , hence ij / ∈ M . We conclude thatĒ p ⊆Ē s ∪Ē d . SinceĒ p =Ē s ∪Ē d , we can solve the forbidden edge problem by checking if e ∈Ē s or e ∈Ē d . For stable matchings, this can be done in polynomial time, see e.g. [6] . For dominant matchings, this can be done thanks to the mapping σ define above, see [4] for details.
We now move to NP-Complete cases. Testing whether a matching is popular can be performed in polynomial time, see [1, 8] . Hence all those problem are in NP. Note that, for a popular matching M of G(ψ), the following are equivalent: st, wx / ∈ M ; tu, xy
Hence, Lemma 9 settles all NP-Complete cases with
To show NP-Completeness when sets U out and/or F out have bigger size, we can add nodes h( ) to U out and/or evicted edges to F out , since we know from Lemma 9 that those nodes and edges are never in a popular matching that contains tu. If U in and/or F in have bigger sizes, we can repeatedly add nodes z, k, with z adjacent to k and k adjacent to g( ) for some literal such that z, k are each other's favorite partner. Then clearly zk belongs to any popular matching, so it can be added to F in , and z to U in .
Consequences of Theorem 1
Lemma 7 implies the NP-Hardness of a number of related problems. The first and more important are the hardness of mwp and miwp. We also discuss here how to obtain the 1/2-approximated algorithm for mwp.
Proof of Theorem 2. Consider the graph G(ψ) from Lemma 7, and give weight 1 to edges ut, xy, and 0 to all other edges. Suppose we want to solve mwp. Because of Lemma 7, it is NP-Complete to decide whether G(ψ) has a popular matching of weight 2. In order to prove the positive result, consider the following claim. Proof. Assume by contradiction that there exists a popular matching M such that w(M ) > 2W . It was shown in [4] that any popular matching M can be partitioned into a stable matching M 0 restricted to a subgraph G (ψ) and a dominant matching M 1 = M \ M 0 restricted to G(ψ) \ G (ψ), and there always exist matchings The 1/2-approximation immediately follows from the previous claim, and the fact that a dominant and stable matching of maximum weight can be computed in polynomial time, see again [4] . Now change weights so that w e = 1 if e ∈ {st, wx}, and 0 otherwise, and suppose we want to solve miwp on the given instance. We deduce from Lemma 7 that it is NP-Complete to decide if the optimal solution is 0. Hence, the problem cannot be approximated to any factor, unless P=NP.
Next corollary deals with weighted popular matching problems where weights are given on the nodes instead of the edges.
Corollary 10. The following problems: Given: a preference system (G, <) with weights w on nodes Find: a popular matching M that maximizes (resp. minimizes) w(M ) are NP-Hard and not approximable to any factor in polynomial time, unless P=NP. Conversely, if w ≥ 0, they can be solved in polynomial time.
Proof. Note that, if we do not make any assumption on c, maximizing and minimizing are polynomially equivalent. So we focus on the maximization. Consider the instance (G, <) as defined in Lemma 7, and w being the vector with −1 in the component corresponding to s, 1 in the components corresponding to y, and 0 otherwise. Lemma 7 implies that it is NP-Complete to decide if the optimum is strictly greater than 0. On the other hand, if w ≥ 0, Lemma 5 implies that the minimum (resp. maximum) of w(M ) with M popular is achieved at any stable (resp. dominant) matching, which can be easily computed.
The next problem can be seen as an extension of pmffe when F out is the only non-empty set.
Corollary 11. The following problem: Given a preference system (G, <) F ⊆ E(G), and q ∈ N, Decide: if there exists a popular matching M of (G, <) such that |M ∩ F | ≤ q is NP-Complete.
Proof. Clearly the problem is in NP. Consider the preference system (G, <) as defined in Lemma 7. As in the proof of Theorem 1, add q pairs of nodes k, z, such that kz is in any popular matching. Let F be the set given by this q pairs, plus st, wx. Then a popular matching M satisfies |M ∩ F | ≤ q if and only if M ∩ {st, wx} = ∅ if and only if the restricted 3-SAT instance is satisfiable.
Recall that testing whether a matching is popular can be performed in polynomial time, see e.g. [1, 8] . We conclude this section by showing that, on the other hand, deciding whether a subset of nodes can be matched among themselves only as to form a popular matching of the original instance is NP-Complete. We call this the exclusive popular set problem. It can also be seen as an extension of pmfee when U in (or U out ) is the only non-empty set.
Corollary 12. The following exclusive popular set problem (eps): Given: a preference system (G, <) and a set U ⊆ V (G) Decide: if there exists a popular matching M of (G, <) with V (M ) = U is NP-Complete.
Proof. Clearly the problem is in NP. Consider the instance from Lemma 7, and set U = ({t, u, v, w, x, y} ∪ V ( )) \ ∪ h( ), where the union ranges over all literals. Let M be a popular matching of (G, <). We claim that V (M ) = U if and only if st, wx / ∈ M . The thesis then follows by Lemma 7. Let V (M ) = U . Then by definition st / ∈ M , and wx / ∈ M , otherwise y is unmatched. Now suppose st, wx / ∈ M . Then tu ∈ M . By Lemma 9, we know that for each literal , g( )f ( ) ∈ M , h( ) is M -exposed, and c( )c( ) / ∈ M for all . Simple arguments (see e.g. the proof of Lemma 9, part 3), imply that, for a fixed , nodes b( ), c( ), d( ), e( ) must be all matched, and all among themselves. This implies V (M ) = U , as required.
